Between tariffs and troops: the friction between Ecuador and Colombia.
- Apr 2
- 3 min read

The 586-kilometer border between Colombia and Ecuador has never necessarily been peaceful. Since the 19th century, when Ecuador separated from Gran Colombia in 1832, the two countries fought territorial wars, in 1832 and between 1862 and 1863, before establishing a relatively stable coexistence. But in recent decades, this relationship has transformed into something much more dangerous: what was once the border between two countries has become a space of armed disputes, international trafficking, and geopolitical tensions that contradict the idea of Latin America as a "zone of peace." The fragility of state control has created an environment conducive to illegal activities, transforming the border into a strategic location for drugs, weapons, and illicit financing.
In this context, the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) played a central role for decades, using Ecuadorian territory as a refuge and logistical base. Ecuador's stance of neutrality, while seeking to avoid direct involvement in the Colombian conflict, ultimately contributed to the worsening of the situation, allowing the consolidation of criminal networks in the region. The dollarization of the Ecuadorian economy also facilitated money laundering operations, further increasing the country's attractiveness to organized crime.
In the 2000s, the situation worsened with Plan Colombia, financed by the United States with billions of dollars in military support. The offensive against guerrillas and cartels had a side effect: the displacement of these activities, especially to Ecuador. The conflict ceased to be exclusively Colombian and took on a regional character, with direct impacts on security, migration, and the economy. As academic Gabriel Marcella described in the journal "War Without Borders," "unprotected borders are a serious threat to the security of several states… the combination of weak states and ungoverned spaces ridicules the international system." This process reached its peak in 2008, when Colombian forces carried out a military operation within Ecuadorian territory, resulting in the death of one of the main leaders of the FARC. The justification of the Colombian government, led by Álvaro Uribe, was legitimate self-defense and preventive attack, claiming that Ecuador did not exercise sovereign control over its territory. Years later, Uribe revealed that he did not inform Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa about the operation due to a lack of confidence in the security of Quito's government's information. The action generated a serious diplomatic crisis, with a break in relations between the countries and military mobilization in the region. Despite subsequent agreements, the structural causes of the conflict remained the same.
In the following years, the peace agreement with the FARC brought expectations of stabilization, but produced an unexpected effect: the fragmentation of the guerrilla group into more disorganized and violent dissident groups. These groups began to operate with a purely criminal logic, intensifying the dispute over trafficking routes. Ecuador, strategically positioned between Colombia—the world's largest producer of cocaine—and Peru—the second largest producer—became the main export corridor for the drug to Europe and the United States. Local gangs such as Los Choneros and Los Lobos began to act as franchises of international cartels, violently disputing control of routes and ports. The consequences were drastic: in a few years, the country ceased to be considered an "island of peace" and began to register one of the highest homicide rates in Latin America. Urban violence, the presence of factions, and the struggle for territory profoundly transformed the Ecuadorian internal landscape.
The crisis reached a new level in 2026, when trade tensions between Ecuador and Colombia escalated rapidly. Measures such as high tariffs, suspension of energy supply, and increased logistical costs triggered a veritable trade war. During the same period, military operations on the border and mutual accusations of territorial violations increased the risk of direct confrontation. The international context further intensified instability. The creation of a US-led military coalition to combat drug trafficking divided the region and reinforced disputes over political alignment: while some countries embraced this strategy, others did not, a fact that amplified the geopolitical fragmentation of Latin America.
In the midst of this scenario, the local populations suffer the most. The economic impact is visible at the border: a drastic drop in trade, rising unemployment, and an increase in smuggling. Regions that depended on the circulation of goods now face stagnation, while illegal routes gain strength, strengthening precisely the criminal groups that governments claim to combat. The current crisis reveals a pattern that repeats itself throughout history: punctual interventions and immediate responses do not solve the region's structural problems. The combination of states with low territorial control capacity, social inequalities, and external geopolitical interests maintains the cycle of instability.



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